




Property rights in personal data
Purtova, N.N.
Published in:




Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Purtova, N. N. (2009). Property rights in personal data: Learning from the American discourse. Computer Law
and Security Review, 25(6).
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021




Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society, The Netherlands 
 
 ABSTRACT 
This contribution is an attempt to facilitate a meaningful European discussion on 
propertization of personal data by explaining the idea as it emerged in its ‘mother-
jurisdiction’, the United States. The piece starts with an overview of how the current 
US legal system addresses the data protection problem and whether, according to the 
US commentators, the law does it effectively. Furthermore, the contribution presents 
propertization of personal information as an alternative to the existing data protection 
regime and one of the ways to fill in the alleged gaps in the US data protection system. 
The article maps the US propertization debate. Pro-propertization arguments are 
considered from economic perspective as well as from the perspective of the 
limitations of the US legal and political system. In continuation it analyses proposals 
on how property rights in personal data would have to be regulated, if at all, in case the 
idea of propertization is accepted. The main points of criticism of propertization are 
also sketched. The article concludes with a brief summary of the US propertization 
discourse and, most importantly, with a list of the lessons Europeans can learn from 
their American counterparts engaging in the debate in the home jurisdiction. Among 
the mane messages is that the outcome of the debate depends on the definition of the 
problem propertization is called on to tackle, and that it is the substance of the actual 
rights with regard to personal data that matters, and not whether we label them as 
property rights or not. 
 
© 2009 Nadezhda Purtova. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
 
Keywords: US information privacy law, data protection, scope of property rights, 
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1. Introduction 
US scholars have been debating whether personal information should be viewed as property 
since the early 70s.1 Propertization would acknowledge the existing phenomenon of 
commodification of, or a high market value attributed to, personal data, and could offer a 
solution to the data protection problem - a result of the 20th century rise of private and 
government databases. The key dimensions of the data protection problem were recognized to 
be privacy as secrecy,2 a bureaucratic way of handling information,3 and the lack of control 
over personal information.4 Introducing property rights in personal data arguably would 
address at least the aspect of the lost control. The natural rights theory has been also invoked 
to support property claims for personal information that implies a certain inherent connection 
                                                   
1  AF Westin, Privacy and Freedom, (1967)  
2  Senate Floor debates, reprinted in  U.S. Senate and House Committees on Government 
 Operations, Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, s. 3418 (PL 93-579), 94th Cong., 
 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 775 
3  P Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy, (1995)  p. 72; 
 DJ Solove, "Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy" 
 (2001) 53 Stan. L. R. 1393,  p. 1421-22 
4  E.g., AF Westin, Privacy and Freedom, (1967)  p. 7; Solove 2001, p. 1428 
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between an individual and data pertaining to him.5 Other commentators see benefits of 
propertization in a rhetorical value of property talks.6 However, the most discussed 
approaches to information privacy as property have come from a utilitarian perspective7 and 
from the perspective of the shortcomings specific to the US data protection system. 
Notably, although the American debate on propertization of personal data has long exhausted 
itself,8 only a few European commentators ever reflected on the idea of propertization.9 
Today, however, there is an apparent need to develop a European perspective on the 
propertization of personal data. Firstly, the commodification of personal information – one of 
the staring points of the propertization debate - occurred in Europe, too. Secondly, the 
problem of the lost control over personal information has received renewed attention on the 
EU level. An example of such attention is a 14 April 2009 video message of Vivian Reding, 
the EU Commissioner for information Society and Media, where she said that “Europeans 
must have the right to control how their personal information is used, and […] that the 
Commission would take action wherever EU Member States failed to ensure that new 
technologies such as behavioural advertising, RFID 'smart chips' or online social networking 
respected this right.”10  Ownership of data is one of the tools at the disposal of law to give 
individuals the desired control. Therefore, the subject of propertization of personal 
information is worth revisiting.  
This contribution is an attempt to facilitate a meaningful European discussion on 
propertization of personal data by explaining the idea as it emerged in its ‘mother-
jurisdiction’, the United States. In other words, this paper does not intend to offer a ready-to-
use European perspective on the possibility of property rights in personal data. Neither does 
this piece argue for or against introduction of property rights in personal data. Instead, the 
reader should consider the contribution as a step just preceding a full-blooded European 
discussion,11 an attempt to look back at the past debate overseas and rehearse lessons learnt 
there to have initial points of reference when starting the European debate. In particular, it 
seems to be of great importance to make the reader aware of the many faces of property that 
appear in the US propertization argument, each ‘face’ defended from a different perspective, 
bearing a different meaning and performing a different function. With this purpose in mind, 
this paper will try to go beyond an obvious insight normally present in a comparative study, 
i.e. that when trying on the US-born idea of propertization of personal information Europe 
cannot be blindly guided by the US debate but needs to develop its own view. Instead, the 
paper will show that, in the US discourse, propertization of personal information was 
expected to perform certain functions, namely, to overcome shortcomings of the current US 
                                                   
5  Solove 2001, p. 1446 (although he does not develop the natural law argument further); V 
 Bergelson, "It's Personal, but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal Information" 
 (2003) U.C. Davis L. Rev. 37 379,  p. 430; MJ Radin, "Property and Personhood" (1982) 34 
 Stanford Law Review 5 957,  p. 959 
6  “Property talk is just how we talk about matters of great importance” (L Lessig, "Privacy as 
 Property" (2002) 69 Social Research: An International Quarterly of Social Sciences 1 247); 
 “If you could get people (in America, at this point in history) to see certain resource as 
 property, then you are 90 percent to your protective goal.” (L Lessig, "Privacy as Property" 
 (2002) 69 Social Research: An International Quarterly of Social Sciences 1 247 ) 
7  Although this is a simplification, when applied to the argument for propertization, this article 
 uses “utilitarian,” “economic,” and “instrumental” interchangeably.  
8  Indeed, a reader will have difficulties finding relevant literature after 2004. 
9  see, e.g. JEJ Prins, "Property and Privacy: European Perspectives and the Commodification of 
 our Identity" in The Future of the Public Domain, Identifying the Commons in Information 
 Law, (2006) 223-257  
10  “Citizens' privacy must become priority in digital age, says EU Commissioner Reding” 
 available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/itemlon> 
11  A fool-blooded discussion on property rights in personal data from a European perspective is a 
 subject of the author’s further research. 
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data protection system (outlined in parts 2 and 3.2); to give individuals some control over 
personal information (parts 3.1.1 and 3.1.2), and generate incentives for companies in private 
sector to respect privacy, create privacy enhancing technologies and, as a result, a better 
system of data protection (part 3.1.3). Part 3.3 presents an outline of the ideas as to the scope 
of proposed property rights. It shows how different the propertization initiatives are with 
regard to the approaches to regulation and content of the proposed rights, and therefore 
suggests that what will matter in a future European discourse is the actual content of granted 
rights, rather than the ‘property’ label. Part 3.4 concludes the analysis of the US 
propertization debate with main points of criticism towards the idea of propertization, 
emphasizing again the importance in a discourse of the content of rights in personal data 
rather than a word used to call them, and raising a question of the necessity of an empirical 
study to (dis)prove some statements made in the US debate to support propertization. Part 4 
ends the analysis by making an inventory of lessons the Europeans could learn before 
considering the possibility of property rights in personal data. Before the analysis starts, a 
disclaimer should be made that since the paper focuses on the US debate, it will draw 
primarily on the US authors. 
2.  The US information privacy law 
The author of this contribution believes that the origin of the idea of propertization of 
personal information in the US largely lies in the inability of the American data protection 
law to adequately respond to (already not so new) challenges of the Information revolution. 
The function of property rights would have been to compensate for this handicap. The 
following section will explain why.  
The US law on personal data protection requires an unfamiliar reader considerable effort to 
understand it. Its complexity stems from several sources. The first is terminology ambiguity. 
In Europe it is not common for textbooks and scholarly writings to refer to this body of law as 
the law of information privacy, or simply privacy law.12 Second, although this choice of 
wording is not surprising given that the data protection problem in the US has been 
conceptualized as the one of privacy, it still reflects (or arguably leads to) some confusion 
when traditional mechanisms of privacy protection are applied to new personal data related 
problems.13 Paul Schwartz and Joel Reidenberg brand this pattern as an attempt to put “new 
wine in old bottles.”14 Another source of complexity, especially in the eyes of a European 
reader, is that the US information privacy law does not have a single hierarchical order of 
rules but comprises norms of tort, constitutional, and statutory law - a patchwork of the rules 
different in sources, subjects of regulation, and applicability. Finally, the body of law at hand 
operates in the federalized legal system with competences divided between the federation and 
the states.15 With no uniform hierarchical personal data protection law in place, Solove 
describes the US system of data protection as the one which “uses whatever is at hand [...] to 
deal with the emerging problems created by the information revolution.”16  
                                                   
12  DJ Solove, Rotenberg, Marc; Schwartz, Paul M. , Information privacy law, (2006)  p. 9; J 
 Kang, Buchner, Benedikt, "Privacy in Atlantis" (2004) 18 Harvard Journal of Law and 
 Technology 1 229,  p. 231, etc. 
13  Solove 2001;  
14  PM Schwartz, Reidenberg, Joel R., Data Privacy Law: A Study of United States Data 
 Protection, (1996)  p. 102 
15  Schwartz & Reidenberg, pp. 7-8 
16  Solove 2001, p. 1430 
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The subsequent sections introduce the US information privacy law system;17 explain how it 
operates, which areas of the data protection problem it addresses, and what gaps the 
commentators see in the patchwork of the US information privacy law which have to be filled 
in, arguably by propertization. 
2.1 Tort law  
It has been widely acknowledged that tort law has played a groundbreaking role in the 
protection of privacy in the US.18 In their 1890 renowned article19  Warren and Brandeis 
derived a right to privacy from the common law torts. However, the role of torts in resolving 
the data protection problem is limited, both due to limited scope of individual torts and more 
systematic shortcomings common to torts as a common law institute. This section explains 
the point in more detail. 
White defines the US torts as a field reflected in individual actions and concerned with civil 
wrongs not arising from contracts.20 The tort law is mainly common law, i.e. it has been 
developed by courts, through the system of precedent.21 That is, when ruling on a case, the 
courts rely on the previously decided similar cases. Yet, the binding force of precedent is 
limited in the US where the courts are “more willing [...] to develop the law in accordance 
with social reality.”22 Due to the constitutional division of federal and state powers, the US 
tort law is mainly state law. 
Branching of the tort law among the states has resulted in “the numerous variations within 
different jurisdictions”23 and “the lack of agreement on fundamental principles of the 
common-law system”24 causing overall difficulties in administering justice. To overcome 
those, The American Law Institute25 produced the Restatement of the Law of Torts, regarded 
as “a very significant attempt at a searching and exhaustive analysis of the entire field.”26 The 
Restatement is not binding. Its role is comparable to that of scholarly writings in the 
international law.27 Yet, it is “the most complete and thorough consideration which tort law 
ever has received,”28 and, in considering the US privacy torts, this study will rely on the 
Restatement.  
The Restatement distinguishes four kinds of privacy torts: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s 
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private 
                                                   
17  The overview of law is not complete and goes as far as it is sufficient to prove the point of 
 this part of the paper: to introduce the propertization argument as it goes in the US in light of 
 the legal background against which the argument emerged.  
18 DJ Solove, Rotenberg, Marc; Schwartz, Paul M. , Information privacy law, (2006)  p. 9 
19  Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890) 
20  GE White, Tort law in America : an intellectual history, Expanded ed (2003)  p. xxiii 
21  R Michaels, "American Law (United States)" in JM Smith (ed) Elgar Encyclopedia of 
 Comparative Law, (2006) 66-78  p. 68-69. 
22  K Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, (1960)  
23  Official web-site of the American Law Institute available online at 
 <http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.creationinstitute>  (accessed on November, 
 18th, 2008) 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid. 
26 WPP Keeton, William Lloyd, Prosser and Keeton on the law of torts, 5th student ed. (1984)  
 p. 17 
27  P Blok, Recht op Privacy, (2002)  
28  Prosser and Keeton on Torts, p. 17 
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facts; (3) publicity which places one in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation, 
for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.29  
The tort of intrusion protects against intentional intrusion, physical or otherwise, “into the 
solitude or seclusion, or private affairs or concerns,” of another “in a manner that is highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.”30 The tort of intrusion has potential to provide a remedy 
against the data protection problem in part related to “an unauthorized acquisition or transfer 
of personal information.”31 Indeed, this tort has relevance for the intangible world of personal 
information since it does not require intrusion into one’s home or other physically defined 
space, but can be of one’s “personality” or “physical integrity.”32 However, in practice it is 
difficult to extend the intrusion tort to cover new information practices. The difficulties stem 
either from some conceptual characteristics of the tort, or from mere unwillingness of the 
courts to expand its boundaries. 
There are several obstacles for the new information practices to constitute intrusion. First, 
intrusion must involve an invasion of “seclusion.” Although the tort of intrusion does not 
require any physically defined private place, the courts have rejected claims when plaintiffs 
have been in public places.33 As a result, a great share of the data protection problem remains 
not covered by the intrusion tort: information collection and use often occur in cyberspace 
many parts of which “may well be considered public places.”34 
Second, the intrusion should be unauthorized. The courts have interpreted this requirement as 
protecting only secret information. In Dwyer v. Am. Express Co,35 a group of American 
Express cardholders challenged the profiling practices of the American express companies 
and their renting of the information regarding card-holders’ spending habits. The American 
Express analysts composed the card-holders’ profiles based on how they shopped, how much 
they spent, and on their behavioural characteristics and spending histories.36 Plaintiffs argued 
that such practices involved disclosure of private financial information and resembled cases 
involving intrusion into private financial dealings, such as bank account transactions.37 The 
court refused to classify the information practices involved as intrusion, because the plaintiffs 
did not establish that the intrusion was unauthorised: “[b]y using the American Express card, 
a cardholder is voluntarily, and necessarily, giving information to defendants that, if analysed, 
will reveal a cardholder’s spending habits and shopping preferences.”38 In other words, mere 
compiling and renting information voluntarily disclosed by the plaintiff to the respondent, or 
creation of new information on the basis of the voluntarily revealed data (profiling) does not 
constitute intrusion.39  
The third obstacle is the division between different kinds of information based on the level of 
secrecy. The courts, e.g. in Remsburg,40 distinguished between information that may be 
reasonably expected to remain private even after disclosure to a third party and information 
                                                   
29  Prosser, Privacy 48 Cal. L. Rev. 1960 p.389 
30  American Law Institute,  §652B (1977) 
31  Bergelson, p. 405; see also Solove 2001, p. 1432 
32  Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., 435 So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983) cited in Bergelson. p. 406. 
 The case-law analysis in the section on Torts is mainly drawn from the works of Daniel 
 Solove and Vera Bergelson. 
33  Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 482-83 (D.Me. 1987) cited in Solove 2001, 
 p. 1432 
34  Solove 2001, p. 1432 
35  Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E. 2d 1351, 1352-53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) 
36  Dwyer, at 1353 
37  Ibid, at 1354 
38  Ibid. 
39  Ibid. 
40  Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A. 2d 1001 (N.H. 2003)  
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that is not so “secret”.41 The court had to decide whether obtaining a person’s social security 
number from a credit reporting agency without plaintiff’s knowledge or consent, and 
obtaining her work address42 constituted intrusion. The Remsburg court classified social 
security number as the information that may be reasonably expected to remain private even 
after its disclosure to the third party and work address – as not so “secret, secluded or 
private.” Only in the first case may a plaintiff maintain a cause of action for intrusion.43 
According to Daniel Solove’s analysis of the case-law, the courts have rejected the intrusion 
claims involving the types of information that are most likely to be subject of collection into 
the databases:44 unlisted phone numbers,45 selling subscription lists to direct mail 
companies,46 collecting and disclosing an individual’s past insurance history,47 etc. 
Fourth, the use of the tort of intrusion in the context of the data protection problem is limited 
by the requirement that the information practice has to be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.48 In determining whether the intrusion was sufficiently offensive, one has to take into 
account “the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the 
intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, 
and the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.”49 Daniel Solove points out that the 
“highly offensive to a reasonable person” requirement is difficult to satisfy in the individual 
case,50 especially, because “each particular instance of collection is often small and 
innocuous;”51 and the required level of danger is created only “by the aggregation of 
information, a state of affairs typically created by hundreds of actors over a long period of 
time.”52  
Finally, even provided the above-mentioned shortcomings are corrected, due to the nature of 
intrusion, the applicability of this tort to the data protection problem would be limited only to 
data collection.53  
The tort of disclosure of private facts is committed when publicity is given “to a matter 
concerning private life of another [...] if the matter publicized [...] would be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person, and is not of legitimate concern to the public.”54 Similar to the tort of 
intrusion, this tort “could conceivably be applied to certain uses of databases, such as the sale 
of personal information by the database industry.”55 However, it is highly unlikely that these 
practices would meet the requirements established by the prevalent case-law.  
Publicity is the first such requirement. For a transfer of data to constitute a disclosure, the 
information must be communicated “to a sufficient number of people, so that it is 
                                                   
41  Remsburg at 1004-05 
42  Ibid. 
43  Remsburg 
44  Solove 2001, p. 1432 
45  Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127, 132 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 
46  Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) 
47  Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 1978) 
48  see, e.g., Remsburg 
49  Remsburg, at 1008-09  
50  Solove 2001, p. 1432 
51  Ibid. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Bergelson, p. 406; WJ Fenrich, "Common Law Protection of Individuals' Rights In Personal 
 Information" (1996) 65 Fordham L. Rev. 951,  at 972 n.150; JR Reidenberg, "Privacy in the 
 Information economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?" (1992) 44 Fed. Comm. L. 
 J. 195,  at 222-223 
54  Restatement §652D 
55  Solove 2001, p. 1433 
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“substantially certain to become [...] public knowledge.”56 However, the sale of personal 
information normally is limited to a transfer from a primary to a secondary collector. 
Further, both standard of “highly offensive” and “highly personal” information, often 
interrelated in actual cases, are difficult to satisfy. The disclosure tort protects only “highly 
personal information”, i.e. it “is not intended for the protection of any shrinking soul who is 
abnormally sensitive about such publicity.”57 Disclosure becomes highly offensive when it 
concerns personal facts that are not open to public eye, and kept by plaintiff “entirely to 
himself or at most revealed only to his family or to close friends.”58 In part concerning 
information open to a public eye, one may extend Solove’s concern with regard to the tort of 
intrusion. Even if a plaintiff can prove a highly personal and embarrassing character of the 
disclosed information, there will be no cause of action if she happened to reveal this 
information in cyberspace often regarded as public. 
Similarly, the disclosure tort does not protect against publicity of the facts in the public record 
“such as the date of birth, the fact of his marriage, his military record, the fact that he is 
admitted to the practice of medicine or is licensed to drive a taxicab.”59 However this 
information is routinely used for profiling. As Vera Bergelson concludes, the disclosure of 
merely neutral facts would not be actionable.60 In most cases the lifestyle information, along 
with names61 and places of work and residence,62 is not regarded as “highly personal and 
embarrassing.”63  
The third obstacle is that the level of protection afforded by the tort of disclosure is linked to 
the social conventions - “the customs of the time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff 
and to the habits of his neighbours and fellow citizens.”64 However, the problem is that those 
habits and socially adopted standards of ‘normal’ in data processing have been altered by the 
very technological and marketing developments which the social norms are invoked to 
restrain.  
Finally, it is difficult for a plaintiff to make use of even afforded protection. According to 
Solove, it is hard “to discover that such sales or disclosures have been made.”65 By design, 
Solove continues, the tort of private facts serves to redress excesses of the press, and 
consequently deals with the widespread dissemination of personal information in ways that 
naturally become known to the plaintiff, whereas “the use and sale of databases is often small 
and done in secret.”66 
The tort of false light protects against “publicity to a matter [...] that places the other before 
the public in a false light” that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”67 The 
commentators agree that this tort has limited or no applicability to the data protection 
problem. Apart from the publicity and “highly offensive” requirements addressed earlier, 
there are several obstacles specific to the false light.  
                                                   
56  Restatement §652D, comment a. 
57  W Prosser, "Privacy" (1960) 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383,  p. 397; Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716, 
 723 (Cal. 1980) 
58  Restatement §652D, comment b. 
59  Ibid. 
60  Bergelson, p. 409 
61  King County v. Sheehan, 57 P.3d 307, 316 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) 
62  Webb v. City of Shreveport, 371 So. 2d 316, 319 (La. Ct. App. 1979) 
63  Bergelson, p. 410 
64  Restatement §652D, comment c. 
65  Solove 2001, p. 1433 
66  Ibid. 
67  Restatement §652E 
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First, false light protects one’s reputation,68 whereas data processing is rarely harmful to this 
interest.69 Second, Bergelson sees no applicability of the false light to the data processing 
where the individuals provided relevant information themselves. The defining element of this 
tort is that the revealed information is false or erroneous, whereas personal information 
transferred by primary to the secondary collectors usually has been provided by the data 
subjects themselves and is correct. Bergelson speculates that a set of information, or a profile 
that is the subject of the transfer, may be limited or one-sided and thereby put an individual in 
false light.70 Yet, she concludes, this argument leads to the absurd possibility of banning all 
information transfers because “no information is ‘complete’.”71 Only when information was 
not provided by the individual, the courts apply this tort to protect against dissemination of 
erroneous information “when the defendant has not taken proper steps to ensure its 
correctness.”72  
A certain information practice is actionable under the appropriation tort if it consists of 
exploitation of “the name or likeness of another” to defendant’s “own use or benefit.”73 
Literature distinguishes between appropriation and the right of publicity. According to 
Prosser, the difference between the appropriation tort and the right of publicity results not 
from the actions that gave rise to a complaint but rather from “the nature of the plaintiff’s 
rights and the nature of the resulting injury. [...] [W]hile he appropriation branch of the right 
of privacy is invaded by an injury to the psyche, the right of publicity is infringed by an injury 
to the pocketbook.” 74 Virtually every state recognizes either one of the two wrongs, often 
making no difference between the two.75 This study also considers them together.  
Commentators agree that this tort has potential to provide a remedy against the use of 
personal information for targeted marketing if regarded as the use of one’s name to profit.76 
Three recent cases - Shibley v. Time Inc.,77 Dwyer, and U.S. News and World Report v. 
Avrahami78 - are usually considered as attempts to bring the appropriation suit against the 
practices of unauthorized dissemination of personal information through the sale of mailing 
lists. However, the courts seemed unwilling to extend the applicability of the appropriation to 
new information practices, and those attempts have failed. Shibley was a class action brought 
in Ohio against a number of journals and the issuer of American Express credit card who sold 
the lists of subscribers without their prior consent to direct mail companies. The court saw no 
action for appropriation because the plaintiff was not used to endorse any product.79 In Dwyer 
(Illinois) the court found that in case of subscription lists “an individual name has value only 
when it is associated with one of defendants’ lists”80 and that “defendants create value by 
categorizing and aggregating these names.”81 In Avrahami the Virginia court maintained that 
“the tort of appropriation is intended only to give redress to a person whose name, portrait, or 
picture was used for either advertising or trade.”82 In Remsburg the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court refined the requirement by stating that the appropriation necessitates the benefit from 
                                                   
68  Prosser, p. 400 
69  Solove 2001, p. 1433 
70  Bergelson, p. 405, fn 143 
71  Ibid. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Restatement §652C 
74  Prosser, Law of Torts §117, p. 401, fn 154: 
75  Bergelson, p. 410;  
76  Solove 2001, p. 1433-34; Bergelson, p. 411 
77  Shibley v. Time Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) 
78  U.S. News and World Report v. Avrahami, No.95-1318, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518 at *1 (va. 
 Cir. Ct. June 13. 1996) 
79  Shibley, at 339 
80  Dwyer, at 1356 
81  Dwyer, at 1356 
82  Avrahami cited in Bergelson, p. 412 
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the “reputation, prestige or other value” associated with the person,83 and “does not protect 
one’s name per se.”84 An appropriation claim was rejected against a private investigator that 
provided his client with personal information of a woman subsequently stalked and killed by 
that client since the benefit did not result from the victim’s reputation, but from the client’s 
willingness to pay.85 Because the key element of the cause of action in appropriation is 
reputation, prestige or other value associated with a name, the appropriation tort is most 
effective at protecting celebrities who have created value in their personalities,86 but not 
average individuals. 
Leaving aside proposals to fix the shortcomings of privacy torts by creating a new cause of 
action against ill information practices, inherent limitations to the common law of tort still do 
not allow creation of a general system of data protection solely on their basis. Among those 
limitations are inhomogeneous and unsystematic character of torts,87 protection of only 
negative rights,88 etc. With regard to the latter, the task of creating positive rights or imposing 
affirmative obligations – as some claim, essence of data protection89 - is alien to the nature of 
tort law itself. Tort law is concerned with providing a remedy against already committed civil 
wrongs and as such can not create positive rights and does not have a preventive function.90  
2.2  Constitutional law 
Some authors assign to the United States Constitution91 a special role of “the starting point to 
understanding of the right to privacy”92 in the US. Historically, the first ‘privacy right’ was 
the right against unlawful searches and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment93 Yet, 
the Constitution plays a limited role in the information privacy system. To understand why, 
one has to obtain insight into the place of this document in the US legal order.  
Apart from establishing the federal government, the idea behind adoption of the US 
Constitution was to protect the American people from possible tyranny by limiting 
government powers.94,95 That influenced the scope of all constitutional rights, including 
constitutional protection of information privacy. First, the constitutionally protected privacy 
interests limit only government actions. Data processing by private entities is not subject to 
                                                   
83  Remsburg, at 1009 
84  Remsburg, at 1009 (see also Restatement §652C, comment d.) 
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 para.8; California Constitution, art.I, para.1; Illinois Constitution, art.I, para.6), they limit only 
 government activities. (Reidenberg 1992: p. 208, fn 61; Schwartz & Reidenberg p.9) 
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 Supreme Court decisions, e.g. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 
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the constitutional constraints.96 Second, although the Constitution prevents certain 
government actions, it imposes no positive duties, e.g. to create data protection system, or 
minimum information privacy protection.97 Finally, the emphasis on limiting government 
rather than citizens creates, as Schwartz and Reidenberg put it, “a basic regulatory philosophy 
that favours the free flow of information,”98 that, as one may think, is rather in line with the 
image of the US as a liberal state. 
The U.S. Constitution knows no express right of privacy, let alone information privacy. The 
sources of the protection in the field are constitutional amendments interpreted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.99 The provisions most referred to are the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Substantive Due Process Clause, the Fourth and the Fifth Amendment.100  
First section of the Fourteenth Amendment, referred to as Substantive Due Process clause, 
prohibits deprivation of any person’s “life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”101 It raises the question whether deprivation “is justified by a sufficient purpose [...] [or] 
whether there is a sufficient substantive justification”102 for it. Courts have been using 
Substantive Due Process to safeguard rights that are not enumerated in the constitution,103 
including information privacy. 
The U.S. Supreme Court found privacy, first in the contraception and abortion cases, covered 
by the concept of personal liberty as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.104 In 1977 
Whalen v. Roe decision105 the Supreme Court extended protection to personal data, 
recognizing “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”106  
However, the significance of the Substantive Due Process for solving the data protection 
problem is diminished. First, as interpreted in Whalen, it protects only information privacy 
understood as non-disclosure of personal information. Second, ambiguous definition of the 
right at hand allows narrow reading of the clause, limiting protection to few kinds of personal 
information pertaining to an abstract notion of liberty.107  
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Under the Fifth Amendment, “[n]o person [...] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself[...].”108 Thereby the Amendment establishes a privilege against self-
incrimination, and prohibits the government from compelling individuals to disclose 
incriminating information about themselves. This way the Fifth Amendment limits the 
government’s power to collect information.109 
However, apart from the obvious limitation of applicability only in criminal proceedings, the 
provision at hand does not create general protection of information privacy or a guarantee of 
non-disclosure. It only protects against the “compelled self-incrimination.”110 That is, the 
Fifth Amendment does not prevent the government from requiring a person to produce papers 
and records.111 Nor does the Amendment protect against subpoenas for personal records held 
by third parties (e.g. private sector data collectors). In short, the Amendment is about 
protection of a person in a criminal case, not personal data per se.112 
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”113 The Amendment limits 
the government power to collect information as a search or seizure.114 Yet, the provision at 
hand does not fully address the data protection problem. 
The pattern of the IV Amendment privacy jurisprudence from Boyd v. United States,115 
(1886) to Olmstead v. United States116 and Katz v. United States117 resulted in a widely used 
test of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Under the test, the Amendment affords protection 
if (a) a person exhibits an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and (b) the expectation 
is one “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”118 
The main criticism of the Amendment’s protection is that it relies on the understanding of 
privacy as secrecy,119 “a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all.”120 The 
second point of criticism pertains to the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard. Solove 
et al point out that the standard is not objectively verifiable since the courts do not rely on 
empirical evidence of what the society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.121 Besides, the 
threshold of what society is prepared to consider reasonable or normal is changing, and after 
the 9/11 events has been “under renewed scrutiny”122  
To sum up, the attempts to address personal data protection problem by constitutional means 
fail both for the reasons of the limited function of the US Constitution, and arguably 
erroneous conceptualization of the problem. However, commentators also agree that it cannot 
be expected from the Constitution to offer a detailed solution to the data protection problem. 
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It only sets a framework for solution and leaves the rest for political process.123 The following 
section focuses on the products of that process – information privacy legislation. 
2.3  Statutory protection 
Federal government responded to the increased public concerns pertaining to the new 
information practices first in 1973 when the HEW Committee issued a report Records, 
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens.124 The report contained a proposal of a Code of Fair 
Information Practices establishing five basic principles: ban on secret personal-data record-
keeping systems; an individual must be able to find out what information pertaining to him 
has been collected and how it is used; an individual must be able to prevent the information 
pertaining to him from being used for the purpose other than the one for which it has been 
collected; an individual must be able to correct or amend a record of identifiable information 
about him; and finally, a data-processing organization must assure the reliability of and take 
reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the data.125  
The Code acknowledged the separate essence of the idea of information privacy.126 The 
assumption behind the Fair Information Practices was that not preventing information 
collection but “delineating fairness in information practices would protect individual 
privacy.”127 
The US commentators agree on a significant role the Code played in formulating the 
information privacy standards.128 However, it is not directly binding and its significance was 
diminished in the course of implementation. Under the pressure from public and private 
organizations, legislative initiatives ended with the passage of weakened legislation.129 Public 
sector organizations (government agencies) argued that that extensive regulation would 
inhibit effectiveness of their operation. Private sector entities testified that the compliance 
with the regulations would be disproportionally burdensome given that there was little 
evidence of information abuses in private sector.130 What the US data processing legislation 
represents now is a system with inherent gaps: with no independent supervisory authority,131 
where public and private sector data processing have been treated separately. The 1974 
Privacy Act regulating public sector processing is a reduced version of the initially proposed 
omnibus law (s. 3418), although generally in line with the Fair Information Practices,132 
whereas private sector data processing is almost entirely left for self-regulation, with the 
exception of a number of statutes, like the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 and the 
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, adopted as a reaction to particularly shocking 
incidents of data mishandling.133 The commentators concur that the regulation of the private 
sector data processing in the US is reactive rather than anticipatory, ad hoc rather than 
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systematic and comprehensive.134 To be fair, one should mention more recent area-specific 
legislation in the field of data protection, e.g. regarding children’s data, financial data and 
health data (HIPPA). However, although these have definitely been received as 
improvements, they address only certain sectors of data processing and the problem of the 
absence of omnibus law establishing uniform data protection standards for private sector 
remains unsolved. 
Correcting regulatory shortcomings in a systematic way and creating such an omnibus law is 
considered unlikely given a strong lobby of information industries in the US Congress, and a 
conflict between data protection and free speech interest which is routinely resolved in favour 
of the latter.135  
3.  Correcting shortcomings of the US data protection system via propertization  
As follows from part two of this paper, the current US data protection law offers virtually no 
tools to return control of personal data to individuals. This is especially so in case of the 
private sector data processing. The criticism of the US information privacy law has been 
followed by numerous proposals aiming to fix the shortcomings of the system. The most 
established ones are retooling the system of torts,136 more regulation, and, finally, 
propertization of personal information. The latter has gained even more attractiveness in the 
eyes of its proponents given the already mentioned flaws of the first two: peculiar nature of 
torts and lobbying power of the information industries in the US context. This section shows 
how property rights in personal data are argued to be able to perform where other solutions, 
arguably, fail, i.e. to give the control over personal data back and create a better system of 
data protection in general. 
To get a more structured insight into the US argument for propertization, it makes sense to 
divide the subject of property in personal data into three distinct issues. First, whether 
personal information should be regarded as an object of property rights. The second issue 
naturally follows from a positive answer to the first question and is with whom - individuals 
(data subjects), or data collectors - property rights should be vested. The third issue is, after 
property rights are introduced, what the default rules (if any) are that should govern their 
transfer.137 
Ironically, with regard to the first issue both information privacy opponents and privacy 
advocates argue for and against propertization, albeit for different reasons. Representatives of 
the information industry argue for propertization as a means to legitimize and facilitate 
already existing market of data. On the other hand, Judge Richard Posner, an opponent to 
privacy and advocate of uninterrupted flow of information, argues against. For Posner 
property rights in personal information provide a means of withholding true information from 
the marketplace and are therefore inefficient.138 Some privacy advocates concur with Posner 
in his conclusion but for a different reason, i.e. that personal data is different from other 
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objects and cannot be treated as property.139 There are data protection proponents who regard 
property regime as optimal for ensuring information privacy. Although, a remark should be 
made here that the privacy advocates do not tend to spend much time arguing in favour of 
propertization per se, but, like Murphy, presume that personal information “like all 
information, is property”140 and immediately move to the discussion on who should own it.141 
When the need for property rights in personal data is agreed upon, the standpoints of the 
information privacy advocates and opponents are much clearer in defending who should be 
the owner of the data. Advocates of data protection stand for the allocation of this resource to 
the data subjects, whereas proponents of disclosure argue for vesting property with data 
collectors. According to Julie Cohen, “opponents of strengthened privacy protection think of 
collection of personally-identified data as ‘their’ property; as evidence, they point to their 
investment in compiling the databases and developing algorithms to ‘mine’ them for various 
purposes.”142 Those opponents of the unchained information market are consistent to argue 
against the need for any default contractual rules governing the data transfers since the market 
already functions optimally.143 To show how property, arguably, is able to give control of 
personal information back to data subjects, the following analysis will focus only on the 
arguments of privacy advocates. 
Although, as it has been already mentioned, the idea of propertization may be defended from 
the perspective of natural rights and rhetoric effects, most commentators in favour of property 
in personal data base their arguments on the economic analysis and specific shortcomings of 
the current US system of data protection.  
3.1  Economic argument for propertization 
Roughly, the US commentators engaging in the economic analysis of law see property as a 
tool facilitating market exchange which, provided transaction costs are minimal, will achieve 
optimal privacy by balancing the value of personal information to a company against the 
value of the information to the individual and the larger social value of data protection.144 
This perspective receives three interpretations by the US information privacy scholars. Each 
of them will be considered in more detail shortly. As a result, it will be shown that, despite the 
fact that the validity of the instrumentalist perspective is not limited to the United States, all 
three interpretations of the instrumental argument are difficult to divorce from the US context, 
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namely, US-specific understanding of property, specific weaknesses of the US information 
privacy, and the specifics of the US legal system in general. 
The three interpretations of the utilitarian argument for propertization are (1) argument for 
individual property rights in personal data as opposed to default disclosure rule, (2) property 
as opposed to torts, and, finally, (3) property as a means to create incentives to apply privacy 
enhancing technologies (PETs).  
3.1.1  Individual property as opposed to disclosure 
Some of US scholars argue in favour of the individual property in personal data based on the 
dichotomy between privacy rule (i.e. control) and a disclosure (absence of privacy) rule. 
Mostly, their argument stems from the assumption they make that personal information is 
property, and assigning it to an individual, within their framework of analysis, is the only 
alternative to the absence of information privacy whatsoever. The argument by Richard S. 
Murphy illustrates this line of thought. Murphy merely presumes that personal information, as 
any information, is property. The question Murphy focuses on is then “who owns the property 
rights to such information--the individual [...], the person who obtains the information, or 
some combination?”145 Depending on to whom the property right is assigned initially: an 
individual or a data collector, Murphy distinguishes two kinds of default rules: non-disclosure 
(or privacy rule) and disclosure. The substance of the privacy (non-disclosure rule) is that “the 
individual can control dissemination of (or has a partial property right in) information deemed 
“private,” but not in other information.146 Under a disclosure rule, control over personal data 
is initially assigned to a data collector.147 Within Murphy’s analytical framework, to have an 
individual property right in personal information is the only alternative to no information 
privacy at all. 
Murphy does not hold a preference to any one of those two rules since for the achievement of 
maximum utility, initial assignment of the resource - personal data - does not matter. A party, 
who values the resource most will always negotiate in his or her favour, provided the 
transaction costs are minimal.148 However, since the latter is not the case in a real world, the 
law in the form of default contract rules or tort should intervene and allocate the initial 
entitlement. Murphy engages in an instrumental analysis of privacy and concludes that “there 
are, also, substantial economic benefits to personal privacy.”149 Since in the utility calculus, 
not only financial but also some psychic values like shame, or a mere taste for privacy count, 
non-disclosure may be more efficient than a default disclosure,150 “Limiting disclosure of 
information may be whenever the individual concerned values his privacy highly, for any 
reason other than to deceive.”151 That implies that Murphy’s defence of non-disclosure holds 
only for some sorts of personal information and in particular circumstances, when disclosure 
will negatively influence the quality and quantity of information (and they are both vital for 
the efficient transactions). The examples of such special circumstances the relationships 
between a doctor and a patient, a client and an attorney, a state and a rape victim, etc.152 A 
newspaper should be found liable for the violation of a property right of a rape victim when it 
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reports her true name. The rationale is that the state has an interest in prosecuting rapists. If 
the state does not maintain confidentiality of the victims, they will not report crimes,153 
similar to the patients who will not disclose to physicians information vital for their treatment, 
or defendants who will be discouraged to fully cooperate with their attorneys. 
Jerry Kang also argues that vesting property right in personal information with individuals 
(i.e. giving the control back) as opposed to the firms would be a more efficient solution. First, 
if the initial entitlement is given to a data collector, the data subjects would incur substantial 
costs to find out what information has been collected and used. The collector, to the contrary, 
would not face extra costs since it already possesses the knowledge on what information was 
collected and how it was treated. Second, unlike the collector, the individuals would face a 
collective action problem. The companies would not respect individual privacy preferences 
because it would be prohibitively expensive to tailor new information practices for every data 
subject. Therefore, individuals would have to unite their effort. In the process “they would 
suffer the collective action costs of locating each other, coming to some mutual agreement 
and strategy, proposing an offer to the information collector and negotiating with it – all the 
while discouraging free riders.”154  
This is a basic utilitarian argument in favour of privacy guided by the considerations of 
efficiency, and would as such be valid in the settings other than the US. What makes it hard to 
divorce from the American context is the understanding of property it rests upon. Neither of 
the two authors gives definition of property in favour of which he argues. Murphy only says 
that one way of securing control over personal information is when “[i]ndividual can control 
dissemination of (or, put another way, has a partial property right in) certain information.”155 
This definition of the scope of property rights as applied to personal data corresponds to the 
popular definition of the data protection problem as the one of the lack of control. But besides 
that, it seems to be rooted in the notion of property as explained in the 1972 article by Guido 
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed156 and now considered standard by the US 
commentators.157 Calabresi and Melamed define property by contrasting it to the liability 
rules. “An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes 
to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in 
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller,”158 whereas “whenever 
someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined 
value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.”159 Some commentators read this 
definition of property as implying “an exclusivity axiom,” i.e. that an owner has a legitimate 
claim to exclude the rest of the world from his property.160 That is, property is ensuring that 
the entitlement (in the case at hand – information privacy) is protected, whereas the liability’s 
function is seen as to make sure that transfer of the entitlement is possible even without a 
holder of the entitlement, against an objectively determined compensation. As Lessig puts it, 
“property protects choice; liability protects transfer.”161  
                                                   
153  Ibid., pp. 2410 
154  J Kang, "Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions" (1998) 50 Stan. L. R. 1193,  
155  Murphy, p. 2384 
156  G Calabresi, Melamed, A. D., "Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: one view of 
 the cathedral" (1972) Harv. L. Rev. 85,   
157  See, for instance, RA Epstein, "A Clear View of the Cathedral: the Dominance of Property 
 Rules" (1997) 106 Yale L.J. 2091,  p. 2091 
158  G Calabresi, Melamed, A. D., "Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: one view of 
 the cathedral" (1972) Harv. L. Rev. 85, Calabresi & Melamed, p. 1092 
159  Ibid. 
160  PM Schwartz, "Property, Privacy, and Personal Data" (2004) 117 Harv. L. Rev. 7 2055,  
161  L Lessig, Code and other laws of cyberspace, (1999)   
 17 
Understanding the US argument for propertization from the angle of Calabresi and 
Melamed’s definition of property makes it clear that within this analytical framework only 
property regime offers some degree of control and protection to personal data. Any alternative 
(liability) rule only secures transfer of personal data, albeit against some objectively defined 
compensation. The remaining versions of the utilitarian argument for propertization rest on 
the same understanding of property. 
3.1.2  Property as opposed to torts 
The second interpretation of the utilitarian argument for propertization is offered by e.g. Vera 
Bergelson.162 She argues in favour of propertization on different grounds, among others, that 
property regime would cure the weaknesses of the current system of privacy torts. Bergelson 
argues that “the choice between the tort regime and the property regime for the protection of 
personal information means the choice between property rules and liability rules as defined 
[...] by Calabresi and Melamed.”163 Indeed, when a system of privacy torts is in place, they 
allow collection of personal information just like a liability rule allows transition of a 
resource. Tort remedy is available only post factum and has no preventive function. The value 
of transmitted personal data is determined not by the holder of the entitlement, i.e. an 
individual, but by the court. Bergelson brings a utilitarian argument similar to Murphy and 
Kang’s that propertization “affords the individual maximum control over personal 
information and allows all interested parties to enter into mutually acceptable transactions 
without tying up the valuable societal resources.”164 Her distinct contribution to the utilitarian 
debate, however, is in two points. First, the preference for torts (i.e. the liability rule) as 
opposed to property implies that “individual entitlements to personal information [...] would 
have to be enforced by litigation, on a case-by-case basis, which would involve considerable 
expenditures of funds and time.”165 Second, since the compensation under the liability rule is 
defined by the state, “the plaintiff will have to prove actual damages, which most likely will 
be trivial. That by itself will discourage people from bringing lawsuits against those who 
violate their rights in personal information, thereby making the rule inefficient.”166 
3.1.3 Property as an instrument to create a general system of personal data protection 
There is another group of the US authors defending propertization from an instrumentalist 
standpoint, though of a different nature. Their main concern is not efficiency, but creation of 
the overall system of data protection comprising law, technology and market tools which 
interaction can ensure proper level of information privacy. Namely, Julie Cohen speaks of law 
as only a mechanism to create incentives to build a general privacy infrastructure: “Law can 
and should establish a new set of institutional parameters that supply incentives for the design 
of privacy-enhancing technologies to flourish. Legal protection alone cannot create or 
guarantee information privacy.”167 
Lessig is probably the most outspoken commentator within this group. He also brings an 
economic argument that property rules would permit each individual to decide what 
information to disclose and protect “both those who value their privacy more [...] and those 
who value it less.”168 However, Lessig only uses economic analysis as a building block of his 
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own theory of privacy protection in the information age, as explained in the book Code and 
Other Laws of Cyberspace169 and its revise version Code 2.0. First, he argues pretty 
traditionally, information privacy is in essence control over personal information. Second, 
unlike in the real world, the architecture (or “code”) of a cyberspace makes collection of 
information and control over that information, difficult for lay people. Third, such an 
architecture is a result of human activity and, therefore, can be altered.170 Fourth, the US 
information processing practices are based on self-regulation, i.e., there is no general 
legislation requiring businesses to alter this architecture and use privacy-friendly 
technologies. Nor is there motivation to account for interests of the individuals. In absence of 
property interests, the companies make use of personal data for free. However, if individuals 
had property rights in personal data, it would force businesses to negotiate with the 
individuals, account for their interests, and alter the architecture, i.e. invest into development 
of PETs. The individual privacy would be better secured, not only by law but by interaction 
of the latter, market mechanisms and technologies.171 
Cohen shares Lessig’s views that interaction of law, market, and technology can create 
conditions for individuals to exercise meaningful control over personal information.172 She 
believes that information privacy protection may learn from copyright where technology 
already offers means to secure property rights that were difficult to protect in the past.173 
Cohen refers to Phil Agre who described ‘technologies of identity’ which made it possible to 
prevent collection of personal data.174  
The same technologies that enable distributed rights-management, she 
continues, functionally might enable the creation of privacy protection 
that travels with data – obviating the need for continual negotiation of 
terms, but at the same time redistributing “costs” away from individuals 
who are data subjects.175 
One cannot deny the potential benefits technology offers to information privacy protection. 
However, Lessig’s argument must be treated with care. Apart from general criticism of the 
propertization argument explained further in the paper, the weakness of his theory is that one 
of Lessig’s basic assumptions (the reliance of the current data protection system on self-
regulation and absence of general regulation of personal data processing) is purely 
American.176 
3.2  Propertization argument pertaining to the specificities of the US legal system 
Along with various interpretations of the utilitarian argument for propertization, some 
commentators favour the property rights in personal data as they could overcome the 
limitations of the US information privacy system.  
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Murphy argues that protecting information privacy as a property right will revive the current 
system of the US privacy torts. For Murphy, one of the reasons why the tort system fails to 
protect personal data is that when a court comes to balance First Amendment free speech 
interests of the press against some vaguely defined privacy interest, free speech naturally 
wins. That would not happen to privacy defined as constitutionally protected property.177  
Besides, propertization of personal data will respond to the individual preferences for privacy 
in a more sensitive way than the current tort system does. Privacy torts operate with some 
objective standards of privacy whereas this is not an objective but a subjective standard which 
has to be protected. In privacy cases, Murphy argues, “strictly speaking, ‘norms of civility’ 
are irrelevant [for calculating utility]” since “the depth and diversity of privacy preferences 
are highly variable across individuals” and “the objective approach will often get the balance 
of preferences wrong.” 178  
Another factor in favour of propertization is that the change in law would not have to go 
through the federal legislative system which, either due to the constitutional limitations or 
influence of the lobby showed itself unproductive when it comes to regulating privacy. 
Jessica Litman who otherwise is opposed to the idea of propertization, admits that the appeal 
of this solution relies on the fact that “property rights can be recognized as a matter of state 
common law without invoking the federal regulatory machinery, which seems too helpless, 
pernicious, or corrupt (depending on your political persuasions) to offer a meaningful 
solution.”179 
3.3  Scope of property rights: default rules 
Another key issue in the US propertization discourse is the scope of property rights in 
personal data, limited or unlimited by default rules. When describing the range of views on 
this matter in the US discourse, this section will show that despite a label of property attached 
to possible sets of rights in personal data, what really matters is not the name, but the content 
of the rights. Indeed, the proponents of the market solutions insist on the widest scope of the 
rights possible, whereas privacy advocates supporting propertization argue for certain default 
rules. The main discussion is focused on alienability, or a possibility to sell personal data, 
which is somebody’s property, freely. Full alienability and absolute inalienability being two 
opposites on a continuum, other options lie in between ranging from more intensive to ad hoc 
regulation. 
As the information industry’s representatives are against individual ownership of personal 
data, they reject any idea of regulating transactions, including the default rules. According to 
the “market purists,” as Solove names them,180 the market already accounts for privacy 
concerns.181 To the extent that consumers want their privacy protected, the market responds to 
this demand and accounts for it in its utility calculus. Indeed, the industries have been 
adopting privacy policies in response to the consumers’ privacy concerns. If privacy is not 
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sufficiently protected in other cases, it means that people value efficient and convenient 
transactions, custom-tuned service, etc. more.182 
When it is agreed that property rights in personal information should be vested with the data 
subject, the information privacy proponents continue to develop default contractual rules that 
would govern market transactions enabled by propertization. However, as Solove points out, 
propertization proponents are “certainly not in agreement over the types of property 
entitlements and contractual default rules that should be required.”183 The literature is divided 
already on the issue whether the rules should be of a contractual nature, i.e. whether the 
parties may negotiate for a different set of rules. Pamela Samuelson who is not a proponent of 
propertization, claims that “information privacy goals may not be achievable unless the 
default rule of the new property rights regime limits transferability.”184 Most market 
proponents, however, favour the default rules that can be “bargained around.”185 
Kang recognizes that merely deciding on the initial entitlement in personal data is insufficient 
and, compared to Murphy’s privacy versus disclosure dichotomy, develops a more elaborated 
system of the default rules. Since it is not efficient for individuals to have to research what 
information about them is collected and how it is used a contractual default rule should be 
adopted that “personal information may be processed in only functionally necessary ways” 
and that parties are “free to contract around the default rule.”186 The ban on transfer on 
personal data from the individuals, or inalienability rules in Kang’s view would be too 
paternalistic. “Control is at the heart of information privacy,” he claims, and control means 
that individuals should be able to sell or disclose their information if they wish so.187 
Inalienability will risk “surrendering control over information privacy to the state.”188 
According to Solove, Kang’s solution “creates a property right in personal information 
through a contractual default rule that limits the way personal information is used after being 
transferred to another.”189  
Paul Schwartz offers probably the most elaborated, and more intrusive, set of the default 
rules, or better, a model of the property regime for data protection. He tries to account for 
three elements of critique of propertization in his hybrid inalienability model, those elements 
being “public good” nature of information privacy; the market failures, i.e. pointing to the 
impact of propertization under current conditions; and resentment to free alienability of 
personal data which implies that the owner of it may sell it whenever he pleases on whatever 
conditions.190 First, he asserts that a public good argument which reads that market cannot 
possibly account for a social value of privacy, does not reject propertization entirely but calls 
for restrictions on it. As examples of the privatized public goods he names outsourcing in 
some sectors of national defence, marketization of environmental laws, and democratic 
discourse via private media.191 The market failures, he argues, may be corrected via 
regulation which constitutes a part of his model.192 As for the fear of unrestricted alienability, 
                                                   
182  DJ Solove, "Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
 Privacy" (2001) 53 Stan. L. R. 1393, , p. 1448  
183  Ibid.,   
184  P Samuelson, "Privacy as Intellectual Property?" (2000) 52 Stan. L. R. 1125,   
185  DJ Solove, "Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
 Privacy" (2001) 53 Stan. L. R. 1393,   
186  J Kang, "Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions" (1998) 50 Stan. L. R. 1193,   
187  Ibid.,  
188  Ibid.,  
189  DJ Solove, "Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
 Privacy" (2001) 53 Stan. L. R. 1393,   
190  PM Schwartz, "Property, Privacy, and Personal Data" (2004) 117 Harv. L. Rev. 7 2055, , p. 
 2076  
191  Ibid., p. 2090 
192  Ibid., p. 2089 
 21 
Schwartz submits that free alienability is not implied by his model since “[according to 
Blackstone,] property can also take the form of incomplete interests [i.e. be inalienable – 
N.P.] and [...] can serve to structure social relationships.”193 This is a premise on which the 
copyright law194 and the US intellectual property jurisprudence rely when rejecting the 
exclusivity axiom.195 The hybrid inalienability model that arguably responds to all three 
challenges thus implies: “limitations on the individual’s right to alienate personal information; 
default rules that force disclosure of the terms of trade; a right of exit for participants in the 
market; the establishment of damages to deter market abuses; and institutions to police the 
personal information market and punish privacy violations.”196 The default rules are: an 
allowed initial transfer of personal data from the individual, but only if the individual has an 
opportunity to stop further transfers or uses by third parties. The ability to block is to be set as 
an opt-in, that is, any further use or transfer is not allowed without an affirmative consent.197  
The model proposed by Schwartz is probably the most privacy-friendly among the ones 
outlined here. However, one may ask what is left of the idea of propertization when property 
rights are so heavily regulated, and why then not to opt for mere regulation. The point of a 
special interest is Schwartz’s rejection of the “exclusivity axiom.” It has been shown that it 
lies at the core of the utilitarian argument for propertization. By rejecting it, Schwartz’s model 
is not able to perform any ‘market’ functions imposed on property by e.g. more economically 
oriented points of view. Thus, the only value of calling the set of rights vis-à-vis personal data 
in Schwartz’s model is that using the label of property will overcome structural limitations of 
the US legal system, e.g. by changing the balance between privacy and the free speech 
considerations in tort and constitutional cases, as well as, property law being mostly judge-
made, avoid the necessity to push new legislation through the US Congress. 
To sum up, the lesson Europeans can learn from the US debate on default rules is that 
property is not an entirely straightforward concept. It has many faces and bears more than one 
function, among others, facilitating market exchange (function of property used by utilitarian 
views and better achieved with minimal regulation) or a mere protective function (performed 
by invoking other than market qualities of property). Therefore, the answer to the question 
whether or not propertization of personal information might be a good idea for Europe cannot 
be simply yes or no, but requires further deliberations on what approach to data protection – 
market or non-market - we are prepared to take, what ‘face’ of property suits best for it, and, 
most intriguingly, if the approach is non-market, do we have to go through the trouble of 
introducing a new model of data protection via property, like Americans, possibly, do. 
3.4  Critique of propertization 
Despite a seeming popularity of the idea, a number of the US commentators are opposed to 
propertization of personal information. Mainly, the criticism is aimed at the ‘market face’ of 
property. As explained earlier, Paul Schwartz distinguishes three traditional elements of 
critique of propertization of personal data: “public good” nature of information privacy; 
related to the market failures, i.e. pointing to the impact of propertization under current 
conditions; and resentment of free alienability of personal data.198  
A number of the commentators see commodification (and propertization as a legitimized 
commodification) of certain goods including personal data as a problem. This is a “public 
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good” argument which implies that information privacy has not only individual but wider 
social value. The market cannot account for the latter. According to Katrin Schatz Byford, 
treating “privacy as an item of trade [...] values privacy only to the extent it is considered to 
be of personal worth by the individual who claims it.”199 For Pamela Samuelson, 
propertization of privacy as a civil liberty might be “morally obnoxious.”200 The access to 
privacy, as to clean air, “should not depend on socioeconomic status.”201 
Peter Swire challenges market solutions on the ground of the failures of the currently existing 
information market. Even if propertization will enable individuals to negotiate their privacy, 
consumers have no expertise in privacy issues and bargaining costs time and effort.202 So 
negotiating with corporations will remain difficult. The introduction of PETs may save the 
time and effort. However, whether it will substitute the needed expertise is questionable. 
Other failures of the current information markets are asymmetric information available to data 
collectors and individuals, and “bounded rationality” of consumers.203 
The argument against propertization aimed at the core of the utilitarian argument is made by 
Jessica Litman. She disputes understanding of property explained by Calabresi and Melamed, 
i.e. as protecting the entitlement and preventing the transfer of information other than within a 
voluntary transaction. She refers to the legal definition of property given in the Restatement204 
and says that “the raison d’être of property is alienability; the purpose of property laws is [not 
to prevent but to encourage and – N.P.] [...] prescribe the conditions for transfer.”205 Litman 
argues that the regulation takes the property model for intangible interests, like intellectual 
property, when it aims “to make it easy to sell them.”206 That being said, the control which 
propertization is argued to be able to achieve, defined as a “right to exclude” others, is of the 
same kind as control conferred by already existing torts: battery protects the integrity of the 
body, defamation protects the reputation without defining them as property. It is similarly 
unnecessary to treat information privacy as property merely to protect it from invasion.207 
Litman also challenges Lessig’s proposal to use property as an instrument to promote 
investments in PETs. She labels Lessig’s argument “a fairy-tale picture” since industries do 
not respect information privacy because it is expensive to honour privacy preferences, not to 
express them.208 Litman expresses her disbelief in market solutions since “the market in 
personal data is the problem. Market solutions [...] won’t cure it; they’ll only legitimize it.”209 
Criticism of the propertization by Solove combines market and non-market arguments. To 
understand Solove’s standpoint, one should recall that his definition of the data protection 
problem goes beyond privacy as control. Solove argues that privacy-friendly propertization 
solutions fail to resolve the information privacy problem because they do not address its 
substance, i.e. “the power inequalities [...] between individuals and bureaucracies.”210 It is 
problematic for an individual to adequately value specific personal information because this 
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value is tied up to yet unknown future uses.211 However, the problem is not the inability of an 
individual to put a price tag on information, but an aggregated inability of many individuals 
disempowering them in the information society.212 
To sum up, a European reader can benefit from several points following from the criticism of 
the US propertization proposals. First, to confirm the point made in the previous section, the 
American debate disregards the fact that property is perceived and, in fact, functions in 
different ways. Main criticism is aimed at the ‘market face’ of property legitimizing to a 
larger or lesser extent commodification of personal information. Schwartz’s hybrid 
inalienability model, however, meets no criticism at all. That suggests that in deciding for or 
against propertization, also in Europe, a lot depends not on the standpoint taken towards 
propertization on its face, but towards the phenomenon of commodification.  
Second, in advocating as well as criticising the idea of property rights in personal data, some 
empirical statements have been made and left without support of any empirical study. One 
kind of such statements is related to the nature of the problem with personal data and its 
processing. Since the nature of the problem in principle defines the tools to tackle it, 
Europeans should look more into the substance of that matter, also in empirical studies. 
Another empirical statement is related to the role of property in restoring control over 
personal data. Who is right:  Lessig who claims, first, that the use of the term ‘property’ alone 
will make people more aware of the value of privacy, and, second, that property will be an 
engine bringing a better mechanism of data protection into action, or Litman, insisting that 
one cannot fight undesirable data market by market tools – has to be a subject of a 
sociological study. 
4. Conclusions: Lessons for Europe 
To sum up, although due to specificities of the US legal and political system Europeans 
cannot fully embrace the results of the American debate on propertization of personal data, 
there are quite some lessons to learn from it. The first, and by far, the most important lesson is 
that the concept of property has more than just one face. The US debate mostly overlooks this 
fact, but a European discussion should take into account that introduction of property rights 
may serve both market and non-market, or protective function. In the US the latter has 
received expression in the proposals to introduce property rights in data but limit alienability 
(the scope of property rights in general) in order to avoid the limitations of the current legal 
and political system. From that the European reader should learn to be open to consider 
property out of the ‘market box’, too.  
Second, whether property may be invoked in its market or non-market face depends on a 
function policy-makers choose for it to perform. Market face, for instance, will be a good tool 
to implement Lessig’s theory and create a system where property creates incentives for better 
data protection and, arguably, gives individuals control over their data back. Non-market face, 
characterized by limited scope of property rights, is suitable for implementing the idea of 
rhetoric value of propertization. It is also possible to assume that in Europe introduction of 
property rights in an object does not have to mean that a free market in that object is 
legitimized. On the contrary, free alienability excluded, property may as well be valued for its 
protective function.  
Third, before the choice for or against propertization of personal data is made, Europe has to 
decide on a number of other fundamental issues. An important one is what its standpoint is 
vis-à-vis commodification of personal information, whether, in principle, it opposes market 
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exchange of personal data or ready to go along with it, albeit, in a (more or less) restricted 
form. The answer to this question, in turn, largely depends on the chosen regulatory strategy 
and priorities and the vision of the role of the state or supranational institutions (paternalistic 
versus liberal). 
The fourth lesson for Europe is that to shape their view on commodification and 
propertization of personal data, Europe has to come to a uniform understanding of the essence 
of the problem it attempts to tackle (if any). In the American literature propertization is called 
upon to resolve the problem of the lost control over personal information. But does Europe 
want its citizens to have full control over a last bit of information pertaining to them? Another 
function propertization, albeit in theory, serves in the US debate is a ‘back-door’ introduction 
of data processing regulation, since a straightforward way at times is problematic. It is 
unlikely that Europe experiences same difficulties introducing new regulations. However, 
possibly there is something more to that protective function of property that Europe can also 
use. The first thing which comes to one’s mind is that status of property rights may give data 
protection rights an extra set of enforcement mechanisms, but that is a subject of further 
research. 
Finally, coming back to the first lesson, Europeans should decide on what scope of rights they 
prefer with regard to personal data, and then see if they have to label those ‘property’ or, 
probably, not.  
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